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Ellul thinks that unity in a political system
means that life has gone out of it. Tension and conflict
form personality, “not only on the loftiest, most
personal plane, but also on the collective plane.” I see a
resemblance to Emmanuel Levinas and the latter’s
perception that the goal of ataraxy conflicts with the
obligation to respect the otherness of the other. To
avoid disturbances to our tranquillity we would like to
make others the same as ourselves. But one only has to
look at Canadian history and the effect of Lord
Durham’s goal of assimilating the French Canadians to
see what enduring resentments this attitude can cause.
Ellul is conscious of writing largely from the
experience of France since Louis XIV, but he need not
apologize for thinking his ideas might have larger
application. Centralizing forces exist the world over,
and they need to be kept in check. He thinks it
important to permit the emergence of social, political,
intellectual, artistic, religious and other groups, totally
independent of the state, “yet capable of opposing it,
able to reject its pressures as well as its controls and
even its gifts.” (222)
He thinks these organizations and associations
should be able to deny that “the nation is the supreme
value and that the state is the incarnation of the
nation.” He allows that there is a risk in reducing the
central power but sees this as “the condition of life.”
Ellul wrote before the arrival of the Internet.
We have seen that the ability of the centralized powers
in the United States to shape opinion by false imagery
failed spectacularly in the attempts to make war heroes
out of Jessica Lynch and Pat Tillman - the latter former
professional football star having been in fact a victim
of “friendly fire.” Contrary credible evidence
circulating through Web sites such as Truthout,
Common Dreams, PRWatch and the like was sufficient
to force the image-makers to backtrack.
But there is no guarantee that the freedom
exercized by those Web site operators will continue
indefinitely, and we can expect battles in this area as
well as on other fronts, such as the attempts to force
television stations that show government video news
releases to acknowledge their provenance in a way that
will minimize their deceptive propensities.
The trouble with illusions is that they are
comforting, and if our vision of life is to maximize
comfort, why bother attacking them? One reason is that
illusions can lead to political mistakes which can have
most uncomfortable outcomes. Another reason,
though, is that other goals and conditions of a good life
include such things as such as honesty, freedom,
integrity, and respect for the Other, and these are
incompatible with the pertinent illusions.

We have to be willing to engage in political
life and work for our desired goals, but always in such
a way as to preserve our respect for the freedom and
dignity of others, even when our goals collide. “We
should forever be concerned with the means used by
the state, the politicians, our group, ourselves.” (238)
We also have to track down those stereotypes and
myths in our own thinking so as to free ourselves from
them, for as long as they exist “no freedom or
democratic creativity is possible.” (240) Coming from
Ellul, the message is not new, but time and events
(including dire environmental forecasts) have merely
reinforced its urgency.
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In this book Ellul delves into history arguing
that until the 18th century revolt had been conservative
and opposed to political and social change. These
upheavals revolted against unbearable situations
resulting from increased state functions. As such,
revolution (or revolt) reacted against the expected
course of history and usually wanted to restore a
previous situation.
Then came the French Revolution which
changed traditional revolt in two ways: a future
oriented outlook and belief in the state as the bearer of
freedom. The aristocratic leaders envisioned a utopian
society which a scientific outlook would bring about.
Inspired by the French Revolution, Karl Marx made
revolution part of history’s evolution. Thus revolution
became normalized and predictable. All that was
needed were the right techniques to predict the
conditions under which the masses would explode and
to direct the explosions into seizing control of the state,
which under the direction of new management would
take on a totally new character: communist.
Ellul argues that in reality the state has its own
internal logic and structure so that those who think they
can control the state are under an illusion, instead that
logic and structure controls the revolutionary.
Revolution, rather than decreasing state power, has
increased the state’s reach. The dehumanizing,
rationalized gaze of the state has penetrated into every
area of life. It is state power, more than colonialism or

class conflict, that truly threatens human freedom. Here
Ellul becomes relentless in his attack on every aspect
of the nation-state.
Ellul suggest that the alternative to state
fetishism is a revolution invoking “direct personal
responsibility” (282). Much contemporary discourse is
still based upon the notion that where real “politics” or
action occurs is in the impersonal machinery in Paris or
Washington D.C. Ellul, however, insists that the only
real thing is the person—spiritual, physical and mental.
Call it anarchism, personalism or situationism (Ellul
uses all these terms while recognizing differences), the
idea is the same. Real change happens where people
begin to take responsibility. For Ellul modern electoral
democracy attempts to tame the inherent anarchy and
unruliness contained in democracy.
Ellul does not call for traditional
individualism. He makes clear how statism and the
technological society create individuals who are
incapable of making decisions that run against
nationalist or technological ends. Yet because of his
polemic against a herd mentality, he fails to make clear
that rootedeness and loyalty to a certain type of
community helps individuals become whole persons,
without which the lures of the technological society
quickly overwhelm. For me—a Mennonite—Ellul’s
failure to place individuals in community is
inexcusable. The state is primarily about creating
individuals without attachment to healthy community
and loyalties that make it possibile to fight the
technological society. At times Ellul seems to forget
that while the great Fascist and Communist regimes
depended upon massive public support, our own
democracies depend upon mass apathy and
individualization.
Despite his failure to name types of
community that resist state expansion and the
technological society, this book is valuable for Ellul
Forum readers to re-read. The dominant emphasis from
the Ellul Forum has been the pitfalls of the
technological society. Yet Ellul insists, “Any
revolution against the perils and the bondage of
technological society implies an attempt to disassemble
the state” (268).
Ellul’s claim that the state is the object of
revolution is also true for advocates of nonviolent
techniques. Gene Sharp and others tout the great
“nonviolent revolutions,” but using Ellul’s outlines it is
best to point out that this is just another vulgarization
of the word. No revolution has occurred in any
Western nation since Ellul’s book. What happened
were in-house regime changes. No Western
“revolution” has successfully dismantled the state and
the technological apparatus (the Zapatistas in Chiapas,

however, come closer to Ellul’s vision).
Finally, if a future edition of this book were
printed, it would benefit from a critical apparatus and
an index. Ellul mentions and discusses numerous
names, places and movements that North American
readers cannot understand without editorial footnotes.
Despite these flaws in the apparatus of the book, the
content remains relevant for those of us concerned
about the expected course of history. Ellul’s call is for
revolt against this dark future looming over us. And it
remains as dark as Ellul ever predicted it would be.
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False Presence of the Kingdom is a critique of
certain kinds of Christian political activity as failing to
live up to Christians' true calling. This failure has
theological and sociological dimensions. Ellul goes
into both aspects in more depth elsewhere. He admits
that the book is best understood in the context of The
Political Illusion and his work on Christian ethics
(later published as To Will and To Do and The Ethics
of Freedom). Also, the distinction between truth and
reality, not fully elaborated until The Humiliation of
the Word, is helpful for understanding this book, as is
the image from Apocalypse of the Word of God (the
white horse) providing counterpoint to the forces of
history (the other three horses) in Rev. 6:2-7.
At this period in his thought, as developed in
the essay “Rappels et réflexions sur une théologie de
l'État,” Ellul allows a legitimate role for political
authority (not necessarily the abstract state) as
administrator of common patrimony.
Thus its
responsibilities are within the realm of reality (visible,
measurable results, accomplished by power); it goes
beyond its bounds if it arrogates to itself the realm of
truth (values and ultimate human destiny,
communicated by personal words, the precondition for
which is freedom). How far one agrees with Ellul's
arguments depends largely on how far one agrees with
his opposition between freedom and power.
Legitimate political authority is in an awkward
position: it needs to have a modicum of power over

